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AMENDING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RULES 
 
RICHARD ALBERT† 
 
No part of a constitution is more important than the rules that govern its amendment. 
Given the important functions served by formal constitutional amendment rules, we might expect 
constitutional designers to entrench them against ordinary amendment, for instance by requiring 
a higher-than-usual quantum of agreement for their amendment or by making them altogether 
unamendable. Yet relatively few constitutional democracies set a higher threshold for formally 
amending formal amendment rules. In this Article, I demonstrate that existing written and 
unwritten limits to formally amending formal amendment rules are unsatisfactory, and I offer 
modest textual entrenchment strategies to insulate formal amendment rules against ordinary 
formal amendment in constitutional democracies where the constitutional text exerts an 
appreciable constraint on political actors. I draw from historical, theoretical and comparative 
perspectives to suggest that two principles—intertemporality and relativity—should guide 
constitutional designers in designing formal amendment rules in constitutional democracies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
No part of a constitution is more important than the rules that govern its amendment and 
its entrenchment against it.1 In constitutional democracies, formal constitutional amendment 
rules constrain political actors2 by entrenching procedures for altering the constitutional text.3 
Amendment rules thereby distinguish constitutional law from ordinary law,4 the former generally 
requiring more onerous requirements to change than the latter.5 Amendment rules also 
precommit successor political actors,6 create a popular check on the judicial branch,7 channel 
popular will into institutional dialogue,8 and express constitutional values.9 Perhaps their most 
important function, however, is to serve as a corrective device: amendment rules authorize 
political actors to update the constitutional text as time and experience expose faults in its design 
and as new challenges emerge in the constitutional community.10 
 
Amendment rules are fundamental to constitutionalism. Whereas constitutional rules 
generally set the “rules of the game in a society,” amendment rules more profoundly establish the 
“rules for changing the rules.”11 As Akhil Amar has observed, amendment rules “are of 
unsurpassed importance, for these rules define the conditions under which all other constitutional 
norms may be legally displaced.”12 Frank Michelman has similarly suggested that “perhaps the 
idea of a constitution requires absolute entrenchment of an amendment rule, which in turn at 
least relatively entrenches everything else.”13 We know, of course, that courts, parliaments and 
presidents routinely alter constitutional meaning informally without a corresponding alteration to 
the constitutional text.14 Yet the prevalence of informal amendment does not obviate the need to 
entrench amendment rules for the functional reasons of written constitutionalism.  
 
                                                 
1 JOHN BURGESS, I POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137 (1891). 
2 Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Models of Constitutional Change, ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 417, 431 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 
2012). Unless otherwise stated, hereafter I use “amendment rules” to refer to formal constitutional amendment rules, 
“amendment” to refer to formal amendment, and “amend” to formally amend. 
3 Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 195, 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012). 
4 EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 222 
(2006). 
5 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 39-40 (1999). 
6 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 101-04 (2000). 
7 Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 97 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
8 Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
386, 431 (1983). 
9 Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 MCGILL L.J. 225, 236 (2013). 
10 Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 
77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 275 (2002). 
11 Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY 319, 319, 321 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 
2006) (emphasis added). 
12 Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 457, 461 (1994). 
13 See Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1297, 1303-04 n.27 (1995). 
14 See Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic 
Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929 (2007). 
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In the Lockean tradition of representative government, amendment rules hold special 
significance: they legitimize higher and ordinary law as derived from the direct or mediated 
consent of the governed.15 The power of amendment is accordingly an “incident of sovereignty,” 
because it is “supreme within its legal system, even if not omnipotent.”16 Amendment rules make 
possible the “fundamental act of popular sovereignty,”17 and hence raise a paradox that 
highlights their importance: the amending power is a constituted power subject to the 
constitution yet it may be used to change the very standards the constitution establishes to 
constrain the exercise of this delegated authority.18 Ulrich Preuss states the point: the amending 
power “is necessary to preserve the flexibility and sustainability of the constitutional order, but it 
can destroy it by amending the constitution in an anti-constitutional tenor.”19  
 
Given the importance of amendment rules, we might expect constitutional designers to 
entrench them against ordinary amendment, for instance by requiring a higher-than-usual 
quantum of agreement for their amendment or by making them altogether unamendable. Yet 
relatively few constitutional democracies set a higher threshold for amending amendment rules. 
The reason why is unclear. Perhaps constitutional designers do not view amendment rules as 
special and therefore deserving of heightened entrenchment. Perhaps they recognize the 
specialness of amendment rules yet entrench them ordinarily on the understanding that 
amendment rules are implicitly entrenched. Alternatively, the failure to entrench amendment 
rules against ordinary amendment could simply expose a design flaw thus far undetected.  
 
My purpose in this Article is to advise constitutional designers on how to design 
amendment rules to protect them against ordinary amendment.20 I suggest that amendment rules 
should be harder to amend than other constitutional rules. My recommendations are directed to 
constitutional designers, not constitutional reformers, insofar as I do not suggest that existing 
constitutions should be amended to make their own amendment rules harder to amend. In some 
cases, that would raise a deep irony, particularly in the United States where amending 
amendment rules to make them harder to amend would require recourse to Article V,21 which 
itself “makes it next to impossible to amend the Constitution” on any matter of consequence.22 I 
am moreover concerned with only constitutional democracies, not authoritarian, hybrid or sham 
constitutional regimes where the constitutional text exerts little or no constraint on political 
actors. It would do no good to make it harder to amend amendment rules in North Korea, for 
example, a country with a written constitution but without a culture of constitutionalism.  
 
                                                 
15 PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 21 (1990). 
16 Peter Suber, Amendment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 31, 32 (Christopher Berry Gray ed., 
2013). 
17 MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 6 (2007). 
18 See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses”: The German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 430 
(2011). 
19 Id. 
20 This Article builds on an earlier series of recommendations for constitutional designers engaged in designing 
amendment rules. See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461507 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
21 U.S. CONST., art. V. 
22 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 21 (2006). 
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Drawing from historical, theoretical and comparative perspectives, I suggest that 
constitutional designers should be guided by two principles—intertemporality and relativity—in 
designing amendment rules. I begin, in Part II, by concretizing the inquiry into amending 
amendment rules with reference to the Japanese Constitution, where this issue is a current 
controversy.23 I also evaluate the textually entrenched forms and limits of amendment rules, and 
demonstrate that existing amendment rules are not well designed to protect them against ordinary 
amendment. In Part III, I evaluate the implicit limits to amending amendment rules, namely the 
distinction between amendment and revision, judicial constitutional review, and unwritten 
unamendability, and conclude that they are inadequate to defend amendment rules against 
ordinary amendment. In Part IV, I suggest intertemporality and relativity as textual entrenchment 
strategies to insulate amendment rules against ordinary amendment. Part V concludes with 
thoughts for further research into the comparative study of constitutional change. 
II. THE DESIGN OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RULES 
 
Around the democratic world, there is mounting evidence of political actors exploiting 
formal institutions to achieve non-democratic ends. Georges Liet-Veaux described this 
phenomenon as “fraude à la constitution,”24 an effort to conceal the intent to defy the spirit of the 
constitution by strict and legalistic adherence to the constitution’s textual rules.25 For example, in 
Hungary, the governing party has used temporary majorities to deploy procedurally democratic 
rules to affect democratically objectionable outcomes.26 In Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras and 
Venezuela, strong presidents have engaged in similar efforts to effectively replace the 
constitution using strictly legalistic procedures or appeals to popular sovereignty.27 In Trinidad & 
Tobago and in Grenada, political actors have sought to reform their Commonwealth constitutions 
using procedures that may be justified by reference to formal rules but which arguably 
undermine the spirit of the constitution.28 In Egypt, Russia, and Turkey, political actors have 
resorted to constitutional forms of government that conceal authoritarianism in the trappings of 
                                                 
23 As a matter of comparative methodology, I have chosen to highlight Canada, India, Japan, South Africa and the 
United States as the primary points of reference in this Article because they are all constitutional democracies with a 
modest-to-strong culture of constitutional veneration, the formal or functional separation of powers, and democratic 
values of transparency, accountability and the rule of law. I also refer variously to constitutional democracies in 
Europe and South America, and in total cover countries representing all continents except Antarctica. 
24 Georges Liet-Veaux, La ‘fraude à la constitution’: Essai d’une analyse juridique des révolutions communautaires 
récentes: Italie, Allemagne, France, 59 Revue du droit et de science politique en France et à l’Étranger 116, 145 
(1943). 
25 Id.  
26 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary and the End of Politics, Hungarian Globe Mandiner, May 12, 2014, available 
at: http://hungarianglobe.mandiner.hu/cikk/20140512_kim_lane_scheppele_hungary_and_the_end_of_politics (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014).  
27 See, e.g., Gabriel L. Negretto, The Constituent Dilemma in Latin America, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, Sept. 8, 
2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/09/the-constituent-dilemma-in-latin-america (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014); Richard Albert, When is Coup Legitimate?, THE MARK NEWS, July 13, 2009, available at: 
http://pioneers.themarknews.com/articles/358-when-is-a-coup-legitimate/#.VEau-LDF9IF (last visited Oct. 21, 
2014). 
28 See Richard Albert, An Unconstitutional Amendment in Trinidad & Tobago?, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, Aug. 14, 
2014, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/08an-unconstitutional-constitutional-amendment-in-trinidad-
tobago (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); Richard Albert, Constitutional Reform in  Grenada, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, 
Aug. 20, 2014, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/08constitutional-reform-in-grenada (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014). 
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democracy.29 Even in Canada, the governing party has attempted to manipulate amendment rules 
in order to amend the process for senatorial selection.30  
 
The next frontier for these formalist attacks on democratic constitutionalism may be 
amendment rules. Constitutional designers would be well advised to design amendment rules to 
resist exploitation by political actors with non-democratic designs. Amendment rules are an 
obvious target because written constitutions commonly entrench them.31 Yet written 
constitutions commonly fail to entrench them against amendment, either because the text does 
not seek to immunize amendment rules against amendment or because the rules intended to 
protect them are inadequately designed to achieve that end. In this Part, I show how the design of 
amendment rules generally fails to protect them from amendment. First, however, I begin with 
the Japanese Constitution, whose amendment rules are today the target of formal amendment. 
A. Formal Amendment and Formal Amendment Rules: A Current Controversy 
 
Modern Japanese constitutional politics offer a current case study to test the theory that 
amendment rules should be entrenched against ordinary amendment. Article 96 of the Japanese 
Constitution requires three steps for an amendment: a supermajority vote in each of the houses of 
the national legislature to propose an amendment; a majority vote by referendum to ratify the 
proposal; and, once ratified, final promulgation by the Emperor.32 Considered only marginally 
above-average in amendment difficulty,33 the Constitution has not once been amended since its 
promulgation in 1946,34 despite reformers long demanding an independent Constitution to 
replace the “American” document imposed by the post-war Allied Occupation.35 Political actors 
have recently intensified their calls for constitutional change, specifically to amend both the 
Constitution’s amendment rules and its Pacifism Clause.36 Entrenched in Article 9, the Pacifism 
Clause commits Japan to “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”37 
 
The incumbent Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has long been a proponent of constitutional 
amendment.38 As Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2003, Abe set his 
sights on the Pacifism Clause, seeking its reinterpretation to authorize the right of collective self-
                                                 
29 See generally Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428965 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
30 See Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465181 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). The Supreme Court 
recently declared those efforts unconstitutional. In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning 
reform of the Senate, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 2013-70, dated February 1, 2013, 2014 SCC 32. 
31 See Francesco Giovannoni, Amendment Rules in Constitutions, 115 PUB. CHOICE 37, 37 (2003). 
32 JAPAN CONST., ch. IX, art. 96 (1947). 
33 See DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (2006).  
34 Yoichi Higuchi, The 1946 Constitution: Its Meaning in the Worldwide Development of Constitutionalism, in FIVE 
DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 1, 2 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001).  
35 See Robert E. Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980, 980-81 (1956). 
36 See Yuka Hayashi, Japan Leader Charts Path for Military’s Rise, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 2013, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578438253084917008html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
37 JAPAN CONST., ch. II, art. 9(1). 
38 See Yshio Okubo, Constitution Debate Due, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Jan. 8, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
1714753. 
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defense.39 Rewriting the Pacifism Clause had been one of the LDP’s founding goals in 1955,40 
and Abe saw his role as helping to achieve this as-yet unfilled objective.41 When he became 
Prime Minister for the first time in 2006, he stressed above all his intention to amend the 
Pacifism Clause.42 He moved quickly, invited public discussion on the subject,43 and eventually 
successfully persuaded the national legislature to pass a law creating referendum procedures.44 
Shortly after the law passed, however, Abe’s plans for constitutional renewal stalled when he 
resigned following the LDP’s historic losses in parliamentary elections.45  
 
Abe was elected again in 2012, and has since revived the LDP’s plans for constitutional 
change.46 He campaigned on twin pledges to renounce the Pacifism Clause and to relax the 
amendment threshold.47 Abe’s plan was to proceed in two steps: first, to amend the amendment 
rules from the onerous supermajority required in both houses of the legislature to a more easily 
achievable simple majority; and then to target the Pacifism Clause.48 The LDP’s two-step plan to 
amend the Japanese Constitution was a transparent attempt to do what it could not do in one.49 
But Abe’s plan met with strong opposition,50 notably from Japanese constitutional scholars who 
                                                 
39 LDP Majority Would be Victory in General Election: Abe, JAPAN POL’Y & POL., Sept. 29, 2003, available at: 
2003 WLNR 1745740. 
40 Masami Ito, LDP Returns with All its Old Baggage, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 25, 2012, available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/25/reference/ldp-returns-with-all-its-old-baggage/#.UiX72NJORIE (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014).  
41 Two Visions for a New Basic Law, NIKKEI WKLY., May 17, 2004, available at: 2004 WLNR 1721088. 
42 See Normitsu Onishi, Set to Lead, Japan’s Next Premier Reconsiders Postwar Era, N.Y Times, Sept. 21, 2006, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/21/world/asia/21japan.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
43 Kelichi Yamamura & Kiyori Ueno, Abe Calls for Active Debate on Constitution Revision, Bloomberg, Apr. 25, 
2007, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0rIYMMxhkgI& (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014). 
44 Linda Sieg, Japan Takes Step Toward Revising Constitution, REUTERS, May 14, 2007, available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/05/14/uk-japan-constitution-idUKT27556720070514 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
45 Bryan Walsh, After Abe’s Exit, Will Japan Retreat?, TIME, Sept. 12, 2007, available at: 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1661074,00.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
46 Shinzo  Abe’s Sumo-Sized Win, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2012, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/12/japans-election (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
47 Reiji Yoshida & Ayako Mie, Abe’s Rightism: Campaign Ploy or Governance Plan?, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, 
available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/02/national/abes-rightism-campaig-ploy-or-governance-
plan/#.UiX989JORIE (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); see generally Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk—The 
LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change, Asia-Pac J., July 15, 2013, available at: 
http://japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3969 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014) (describing the LDP’s platform on 
constitutional change).  
48 Tobias Harris, Shinzo Abe’s Constitution Quest, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2013, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323582904578486642338035044.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).  
49 Colin P.A. Jones, Tweek the Constitution Now, Think Later?, JAPAN TIMES, June 25, 2013, available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/06/25/issues/tweak-the-constitution-now-think-later (last visited Oct. 
21, 2014).  
50 See, e.g., Aurelia George Mulgan, Abe Rocks Japan’s Constitutional Boat, EAST ASIA FORUM, May 21, 2013, 
available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/21/abe-rocks-japans-constitutional-boat (last visited Oct. 21, 
2014); Linda Seig, Japan PM’s “Stealth” Constitution Plan Raises Civil Rights Fears, REUTERS, May 1, 2013, 
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/01/us-japan-politics-constitution-idUSBRE9400ZT20130501 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2014); Editorial, LDP Out to Undermine Constitution, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, available 
at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/ldp-out-to-undermine-constitution/#.UiabNdJORIF 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
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joined publicly under the banner of “Group Article 96” to protest his efforts.51 The Group rejects 
his plan as the “destruction of constitutionalism”52 and an “abuse of power.”53 Still, amendments 
to Articles 9 and 96 continue to loom as a real possibility in Japan as Abe consolidates power. 
B. The Forms and Limits of Amendment Rules 
 
Amendment rules are generally entrenched in one of three ways: ordinarily, specially or 
absolutely. They are most commonly entrenched under the rules of ordinary amendment and 
consequently enjoy no greater degree of entrenchment than any other constitutional provision. 
Political actors therefore need no higher quantum of agreement to amend these fundamental rules 
than less consequential matters like regulating public access to local water board meetings, as is 
the case in the Netherlands.54 Amendment rules in Japan—as in Australia,55 India,56 Ireland,57 
and Spain,58 to name a few—reflect this standard design of amendment rules in constitutional 
democracies. Less commonly, amendment rules may be specially entrenched under heightened 
amendment thresholds or they may be absolutely entrenched altogether.59  
 
We only exceptionally find constitutions designed to resist or even complicate amending 
amendment rules. Even constitutions whose text purports to absolutely entrench amendment 
rules against amendment fail to protect amendment rules. Their entrenchment mechanisms 
conceal a design flaw that undermines the special or absolute entrenchment of amendment rules, 
as I will discuss below.60 In this Section, I illustrate the two main strategies constitutional 
designers deploy to entrench amendment rules against amendment: absolute entrenchment, 
known as unamendability, and heightened entrenchment, which I will describe as escalating 
amendment thresholds. The former is ineffective and the latter is rare yet neither offers a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of amending amendment rules. 
 
Consider first unamendability. Democratic constitutions sometimes make certain 
constitutional provisions formally unamendable by immunizing them against amendment. The 
Italian Constitution, for example, states that “the form of Republic shall not be a matter for 
constitutional amendment.”61 The French Constitution likewise attempts to foreclose 
                                                 
51 Yuka Hayashi, New Headwinds for Constitutional Campaign, Wall St. J., May 23, 2013, available at: 
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-239526/?mod=wsj_streaming_latest-headlines (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
52 Hideaki Ishibashi, Scholars Form Group to Protest Abe’s Planned Revision of Constitution, Asahi Shimbun AJW, 
May 24, 2013, available at: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305240047 (last visited Oct. 21, 
2014). 
53 Reiji Yoshida, Amending Constitution Emerges as Poll Issue, JAPAN TIMES, May  3, 2013, available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/03/national/amending-constitution-emerges-as-poll-issue (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014). 
54 See NETHERLANDS CONST., ch. VIII, arts. 137-142 (1983) (detailing amendment rules); Id. at ch. VII, art. 133 
(requiring Parliament to regulate public access to water board meetings). 
55 See AUSTRALIA CONST., ch. VIII, art. 128 (1900). 
56 See INDIA CONST., pt. XX, art. 368 (1950). 
57 See IRELAND CONST., art. 46 (1937). 
58 See SPAIN CONST., pt. X, arts. 166-68 (1978). 
59 See infra text accompanying notes 51-79. 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 57-79. 
61 ITAL. CONST., pt. 2, titl VI, s.2, art. 139 (1948). 
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amendments to republicanism: “The Republican form of government shall not be the object of 
any amendment.”62 To highlight a few other examples, democratic constitutions also entrench 
similar amendment rules on violating secularism,63 diminishing fundamental rights,64 and 
compromising federalism.65 Yet despite their textual insistence to the contrary, these provisions 
are not really unamendable because they conceal a serious design flaw.66 
 
The United States Constitution illustrates this design flaw in its entrenchment of 
temporarily and constructively unamendable clauses.67 Under Article V, the Constitution may be 
formally amended in four ways requiring the approval of national and state institutions.68 The 
text states that no formal amendment may be made to the Importation and Census-Based 
Taxation Clauses until 1808,69 thus making them both temporarily unamendable. The text also 
states that no formal amendment may be made to the Equal Suffrage Clause without the consent 
of the state whose Senate suffrage is diminished, thereby effectively creating a form of 
constructive unamendability since no state is likely to agree to reduced power in the Senate.70 
Scholars have interpreted these temporarily and constructively unamendable provisions as 
actually unamendable.71 But none is truly unamendable as a matter of formal amendment. 
 
The design flaw springs from their susceptibility to double amendment. Though each 
clause tries to entrench something against amendment—importation, census-based taxation, 
equal suffrage—none is itself entrenched against amendment. This design law creates the 
possibility of amending the entrenching clause in order to circumvent the intended entrenchment. 
Consider the Equal Suffrage Clause, which requires the consent of the state whose suffrage is 
diminished. Political actors could use Article V first to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause either 
by repealing it or modifying it, and then second to diminish a state’s equal suffrage without its 
consent.72 This double amendment procedure is admittedly a “sly scheme,” writes Akhil Amar, 
                                                 
62 FRANCE CONST., tit. XVI, art. 89 (1958). 
63 See PORTUGAL CONST., pt. IV, tit. II, art. 288(c) (1976). 
64 See CAPE VERDE CONST., pt. VI, tit. III, art. 313(2) (1980). 
65 See GERMANY CONST., pt. VII, art. 79(3) (1949). 
66 Of course, unamendability cannot survive revolution, see John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional 
Amending Process, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 373, 375 (1985). 
67 I have discussed elsewhere the phenomena of temporary and constructive unamendability. See Richard Albert, 
Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1040-45 (2014). 
68 U.S. CONST. art. V (1789). 
69 Id. (“Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight 
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article.”). 
70 Id. (“Provided that … no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
71 Scholars have interpreted the Importation and Census-Based Taxation Clauses as unamendable through the year 
1808. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 
1708 (1997); Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 519 (2011); Arthur W. Machen, 
Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 172 (1910); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 1747, 1796 (2005);. Scholars have also interpreted the Equal Suffrage Clause as unamendable. See, e.g., 
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution as a Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 149 (1995); Douglas H. 
Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 
562 (2002); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 697 n.128 (2011). 
72 See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J. L. & POL. 21, 
69 (1997). 
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but it would nonetheless “have satisfied the literal text of Article V and would also have 
comported with the Constitution’s general principle of ongoing popular sovereignty.”73  
 
Some constitutions properly entrench the entrenching clause against amendment. For 
example, the Honduran Constitution entrenches its entrenching clause, and consequently avoids 
the double amendment tactic.74 To correct the design flaw evident in amendment rules, 
constitutional designers starting afresh could entrench against amendment both the amendment 
rules and the entrenching clause at little additional political cost.75 To illustrate, consider the 
German Basic Law, which states that amendments “affecting the division of the Federation into 
Lander, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in 
Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”76 In order to protect this entrenching clause from 
amendment, the revised provision would state that “… in the legislative process, the principles 
laid down in Articles 1 and 20, or this Article shall be inadmissible.” This revision only 
minimally changes the text but works an important substantive change.77 Even this revision, 
however, does not reflect the optimal design of amendment rules, as I discuss below in Part IV. 
 
Constitutional designers have less frequently, though no less problematically, deployed a 
second strategy to specially entrench amendment rules: escalating amendment thresholds. 
Democratic constitutions sometimes entrench more than one formal amendment procedure, each 
one deployable against specific constitutional provisions or principles, and disabled as to others. 
For example, the South African Constitution entrenches three amendment procedures whose use 
is expressly restricted to certain constitutional provisions.78 One amendment procedure requires 
the approval of three-quarters of the National Assembly and two-thirds of the National Council 
of Provinces; this procedure must be used for amendments to the Constitution’s statement of 
values as well as the amendment rules themselves.79 The amendment rules are therefore properly 
                                                 
73 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 293 (2006). Even if unamendability falls short of 
actual unamendability, it may still chill repeal efforts, heighten public awareness of the entrenched value and, in any 
event, the double amendment procedure introduces an additional procedural hurdle to amendment. See Yaniv 
Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional 
Amendment Powers (unpublished dissertation on file with author). The double amendment strategy arguably 
circumvents the spirit of the constitution. 
74 HONDURAS CONST., tit. VII, ch. I, art. 373 (authorizing amendment by two-thirds of the National Congress in two 
subsequent votes) (1982); id. at art. 374 (entrenching Article 373, the form of government, national territory, the 
presidential term and qualifications, and the entrenching article itself against amendment). 
75 Even the Honduran Constitution’s proper constitutional design has not prevented political actors from attempting 
to circumvent its unamendable provisions. See David Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, 89 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 611, 621-29 (2012). But this incident was less a failure of constitutional design than of constitutional 
democracy. See Andrew Friedman, Dead Hand Constitutionalism, 4 MEX. L. REV. 77, 82-83, 94-95 (2010). 
76 GERMAN BASIC LAW, pt. VII, art. 79(3) (1949). 
77 In Germany, scholars generally reject the double amendment tactic as illegitimate. See Virgílio Afonso Da Silva, 
A Fossilised Constitution?, 17 RATIO JURIS 454, 458 (2004). The Federal Constitutional Court also possesses the 
power to invalidate constitutional amendments that violate the text or the spirit of the Basic Law. See DONALD P. 
KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
46-59 (3d ed. 2012). Yet that the conventional view in Germany today rejects double amendment does not mean that 
it will remain illegitimate tomorrow. This reflects the difficulty: the integrity of the Basic Law’s amendment rules 
relies on the good faith of the very political actors who might in the future attempt to amend those rules, with or 
without the support or acquiescence of scholars and jurists. I address this difficulty in Sections III.A and III.C. 
78 SOUTH AFRICA CONST., ch. 4, s.74 (1996). 
79 Id. at subsec.74(1). 
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entrenched. A less exacting procedure—two-thirds approval in both the National Assembly and 
the National Council of Provinces—must be used to amend the Bill of Rights and matters 
relating generally to provincial rights.80 The least exacting threshold—two-thirds approval in the 
National Assembly—is the default amendment procedure;  it must be used to amend all other 
provisions not specifically assigned to either of the two more exacting amendment procedures.81 
 
Canada’s amendment rules are similarly specially entrenched in an escalating structure. 
The Canadian Constitution entrenches five distinguishable amendment procedures, each 
expressly designated for amending only specific categories of provisions. The unilateral 
provincial procedure authorizes a province to amend its own constitution.82 The unilateral 
parliamentary procedure confers an analogous power to Parliament with respect to Parliament’s 
internal constitution.83 The parliamentary-provincial procedure requires approval resolutions in 
Parliament and the legislature of the province(s) affected by the amendment.84 The fourth 
procedure is the default multilateral amendment procedure. It must be used to amend everything 
not otherwise assigned to another procedure; it requires approval resolutions in Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures of at least seven of the ten provinces representing at least half of their 
total population.85 The final amendment procedure—unanimity—requires approval resolutions in 
Parliament and each of the provincial legislatures.86 This unanimity procedure applies to specific 
categories of items in the Constitution of Canada, including the entire escalating structure of 
formal amendment, which are properly entrenched against double amendment.87  
 
Both the Canadian and South African Constitutions create a formal constitutional 
hierarchy that situates constitutional provisions and principles relative to each other along a scale 
of ascending amendment difficulty.88 Some provisions are subject to the default amendment rule, 
others are amendable only by an intermediate threshold, and still others—notably the amendment 
rules themselves—are insulated against amendment by the highest threshold. The degree of 
amendment difficulty rises in proportion to the salience of the entrenched provision; here, the 
special entrenchment of amendment rules reflects their importance.89 In contrast to the design 
flaw generally evident in unamendability, escalating amendment rules avoid the double 
amendment problem by specially entrenching themselves with heightened thresholds. 
                                                 
80 Id. at subsec.74(2)-(3). 
81 Id. at subsec.74(1). 
82 Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, § 45, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1982”). 
83 Id. at s.44. 
84 Id. at s.43. 
85 Id. at s.38(1). This procedure is the exclusive amendment formula for specific items. Id. at s.42(1). 
86 Id. at s.41.  
87 Id. 
88 Another illustrative example is the Bulgarian Constitution, which authorizes the National Assembly to amend all 
provisions of the Constitution with the exception of certain constitutional items, including amendment rules 
themselves, which may be amended only by a specially constituted Grand National Assembly. See BULGARIA 
CONST., Ch. 9, arts. 153, 158 (1991). 
89 This tiered arrangement may increase deliberation on higher-salience political issues, decelerate the pace of 
formal amendment create higher bargaining costs to achieve a given constitutional change, and it may also moderate 
the enthusiasm that risk-averse political actors might otherwise have for amending a provision subject to the higher-
than-normal formal amendment threshold. See Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative 
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 103-04 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
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 Yet these escalating amendment thresholds are subject to two limitations of their own. 
First, they cannot by themselves thwart formally democratic efforts to achieve substantively non-
democratic ends. Specifically, escalating amendment thresholds cannot resist the problem that 
David Landau calls abusive constitutionalism, defined as “the use of the mechanisms of 
constitutional change in order to make a state significantly less democratic than it was before.”90 
Landau focuses on formal constitutional change, and states that “the core problem, then, is that it 
is fairly easy to construct a regime that looks democratic but in actuality is not fully 
democratic.”91 As Landau demonstrates, hybrid regimes in Colombia and Hungary have 
managed to commandeer democratic institutions to effect formal constitutional change at least 
superficially consistent with democratic imperatives but actually non-democratic in effect.92  
 
The second limitation of escalating amendment thresholds concerns the quality of the 
supermajorities they require for amendment. Escalating thresholds may not be difficult for 
upstart political movements to achieve, particularly in the hybrid regimes Landau discusses.93 
But even in truly democratic regimes, escalation offers a weak defense against strong but fleeting 
and unsustainable majorities that form behind political movements.94 Temporary majorities may 
be able to meet the heightened thresholds required to amend amendment rules, but we must 
interrogate the popular legitimacy of strong majorities that collapse as quickly as they form.95 
These temporary supermajorities are insufficiently durable to legitimately express the considered 
judgment of the community. Only more permanent supermajorities reflecting the principle of 
intertemporality—represented by supermajorities that endure for a number of years—can qualify 
as legitimately representative of the will of the community. The durability of supermajorities will 
be the basis for my recommendations below in Part IV.96 
 
 Let us return to Japan. The Constitution establishes only one amendment rule,97 making 
Japan’s amendment rules amendable by ordinary amendment. Even were Japan’s amendment 
rules modified to make them formally unamendable pursuant to the standard design of 
unamendability, they would not in fact be unamendable, given their susceptibility to double 
amendment. And even were Japan’s amendment rules specially entrenched under a heightened 
threshold, for instance as we currently see in Canada or South Africa, they would be susceptible 
to amendment either with recourse to formal democratic commandeering or by temporary 
majorities alone. These threats to constitutional democracy are especially problematic in Japan in 
                                                 
90 David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 195 (2013). 
91 Id. at 200. 
92 Id. at 200-03, 208-11. 
93 Id. at 227. 
94 Recent developments in Hungary demonstrate the threat of temporary majorities and supermajorities. See Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions can Strengthen Peak 
Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary), 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 60-71 
(2014). 
95 See generally CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 52-53 (Jeffrey Seitzer transl. ed., 2008) (discussing 
how fleeting majorities may use amendment to extend their power beyond their duration). 
96 See infra text accompanying notes 194-211. 
97 JAPAN CONST., ch. IX, art. 96. 
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light of the misalignment between parliamentarians and the public on the Pacifism Clause: only 
50 percent of voters but as much as 89 percent of parliamentarians favor its amendment.98 
III. IMPLICIT LIMITS TO AMENDING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RULES 
 
Constitutional designers should therefore refrain from replicating the current design of 
amendment rules in their own democratic constitutions. The standard design does not adequately 
account for the risk that amendment efforts will target amendment rules themselves. The 
inadequacy of the current design of amendment rules is reflected in defective constitutional texts, 
which fall short of their purpose to insulate amendment rules from ordinary amendment.  
 
To be fair, these textual defects are not fatal to the effort to defend amendment rules from 
ordinary formal amendment. Political actors may invoke theories of implicit limits to formal 
amendment. In this Part, I evaluate three implicit limits to the ordinary amendment of 
amendment rules. Each concerns unamendability but it is operationalized in different ways: the 
distinction between amendment and revision is anchored in theory and is sometimes reflected in 
the constitutional text but ultimately governed by political practice; judicial constitutional review 
enforces both written and unwritten unamendability via constitutional interpretation in courts; 
and political actors make and police claims of unwritten unamendability in the political arena. 
Although these three limits overlap in material ways, it is useful to disentangle them to the extent 
possible, while nonetheless recognizing their deep interconnections. I conclude that these three 
implicit limits are problematic for defending amendment rules from ordinary amendment. 
A. Amendment and Revision 
 
Faced with a constitutional text that does not specially entrench amendment rules against 
ordinary amendment, political actors opposed to efforts to amend amendment rules may invoke 
the distinction between amendment and revision. Both amendment and revision are species of 
constitutional change. The latter refers to fundamental changes to the constitution typically 
requiring more exacting procedures than the former, which generally requires a lower 
amendment threshold and is used for narrow, non-transformative adjustments.99 Whereas an 
amendment alters the constitution harmoniously with its spirit and structure, a revision departs 
from its presuppositions and is inconsistent with its framework,100 thereby disrupting the 
continuity of the legal order.101 The distinction between amendment and revision is largely 
theoretical, though it is sometimes entrenched in constitutional texts that expressly impose higher 
thresholds for revision than they do for amendment.102 
 
                                                 
98 See Linda Seig, Japan Voters Split on Revising Pacifist Constitution: Poll, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2013, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/28/us-japan-politics-constitution-idUSBRE90R01M20130128 (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014).  
99 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238-39 (2d ed. 1996); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 498 n.4 (2007). 
100 See Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J. 109, 118 (1893).  
101 See SUBER, supra note 15, at 18-20. 
102 See, e.g., AUSTRIA CONST., ch. II, art. 44(3) (1920); SPAIN CONST., pt. X, arts. 166-68 (1978); SWITZERLAND 
CONST., tit. VI, ch. 1, arts. 192-95 (1999). 
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For Carl Schmitt, the distinction between amendment and revision concerns the 
boundaries of amendment authority.103 Political actors on whom the constitution confers 
amendment authority may undertake its amendment “only under the presupposition that the 
identity and continuity of the constitution as an entirety is preserved.”104 To amend the 
constitution is therefore only to make additions, deletions and other alterations “that preserve the 
constitution itself”105 with no threat of “offending the spirit or the principles” of the 
constitution.106 To revise, in contrast, is to affect major constitutional change to the polity.107 
 
In Japan, political actors opposed to amending Articles 96 or even the constitutional 
values in Article 9 could contend that these changes amount to revision and are consequently not 
achievable by ordinary amendment but only with a more deliberative or representative form of 
democratic endorsement.108 They could moreover argue that the amendment rules in Article 96 
cannot be used to amend either Articles 96 or 9 because it applies only to amendments, not 
revisions.109 These political actors would nonetheless be forced to concede that although Articles 
96 or 9 are not amendable, they are fully revisable, though only with more exacting procedures.  
 
Here is where the theory of amendment and revision would collide with the politics of 
constitutional law. Though political actors may have compelling reasons anchored in the 
theoretical distinction between amendment and revision to oppose efforts to amend amendment 
rules, those reasons are valid only, first, to the extent they are viewed as authoritative in the 
political arena and, second, where political opponents ultimately recognize the legitimacy of 
those reasons or acquiesce to them. That this distinction is not textually entrenched in the 
Japanese Constitution undermines it by reducing it to a matter of constitutional politics. Invoking 
this distinction in Japan to defend amendment rules against ordinary amendment raises the same 
question political actors are currently facing in Germany as to the constitutional limits on 
European integration: what counts as a valid constitutional amendment?110 
 
                                                 
103 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (Jeffrey Seitzer transl. ed., 2008). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 153. 
107 But sometimes even a total revision must respect the basic premises of the regime See id. at 152 (explaining that 
“total revision” in Switzerland cannot eliminate the state’s democratic foundations). 
108 The distinction between amendment and revision is not acknowledged in either the substantive or rhetorical 
debate on constitutional change in Japan. Consequently, although political actors use the term “revision” not 
“amendment” with respect to amending Articles 9 and 96, the actual distinction is mooted since political actors are 
proceeding as though they are bound by the amendment rules of Article 96. See KENNETH L. PORT, TRANSCENDING 
LAW: THE UNINTENDED LIFE OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 19-21 (2010). 
109 JAPAN CONST., ch. IX, art. 96. 
110 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in the Lisbon Treaty Case has ignited debate about the 
country’s constitutional identity, the extent to which European integration would change the country’s identity, 
which political actors should have the authority to alter that identity, and what constitutional procedures if any may 
be used to alter it. Compare Lisbon Treaty Case (2009), 123 BVerfGE 267, in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 77, 
at 345-48 (ruling that German constitutional identity cannot be altered by treaty or constitutional amendment where 
the treaty or amendment violates self-determination or sovereignty), with Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Möllers, 
The German Constitutional Court Says “Ja zu Deutschland!”, 10 German L.J. 1241, 1252-56 (2009) (critiquing the 
Court’s ruling), and Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones At Sea, 10 German L.J. 
1201, 1208-10 (2009) (same). 
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Whether a constitutional change may be called an amendment or a revision is contestable. 
For example, although scholars endorsing the distinction between amendment and revision might 
agree that the United States Constitution should protect certain constitutional principles against 
amendment, they need not agree on precisely which constitutional principles should enjoy this 
special status. As Melissa Schwartzberg observes, “[e]fforts at restricting the boundaries of 
constitutional amendment are bound to be challengeable, and reasonable people are likely to 
disagree about what constitutes an unalterable principle.”111 Laurence Tribe relatedly suggests 
that we should expect disagreement about what should and should not be amendable because 
constitutional vales and identity “cannot be objectively deduced or passively discerned in a 
viewpoint-free way.”112 We may agree that the United States Constitution contains unamendable 
rules, but that is only the first step in distinguishing amendable from revisable provisions. We 
must also take the harder step to agree on what those unamendable items are.113 Agreement on 
the most important principles therefore does not immediately clarify what is amendable or not.114 
 
 In Japan, political actors must contend with a similar contestability. The strength of the 
argument that amending Articles 96 or 9 amounts to a revision, not an amendment, would 
depend on how political actors and citizens evaluate it. Absent a textual signal to the contrary, 
what Jason Mazzone calls the “practicalities” of the theoretical argument on amendment versus 
revision threaten to defeat efforts to identify and enforce limits on amendment.115 Identifying and 
enforcing these limits falls to the political process and rests on the very actors who would mount 
an effort to amend a constitutional provision, principle or rule—including amendment rules 
themselves—that should be entrenched against ordinary amendment. Without a textual limitation 
distinguishing what is subject to amendment from what is subject to revision, we should 
therefore not presume that political actors intent on using the modalities of narrow amendment in 
order to affect a larger revision will self-police, even in constitutional democracies. 
B. Judicial Constitutional Review 
 
Where political actors will not self-police the theoretical distinction amendment and 
revision, courts have sometimes intervened to enforce the rule that amendment procedures may 
be used for only modest adjustments while fundamental changes may be accomplished only 
through revision. For example, in India the Supreme Court has developed the “basic structure” 
doctrine to enforce unwritten substantive restrictions against amendments that nonetheless 
conform to the constitution’s explicit procedural requirements.116 Like the distinction between 
amendment and revision, this basic structure doctrine is predicated on the theory that amendment 
cannot be used to transform the constitution or to change its identity.117 The Court has relied on 
the basic structure doctrine to prohibit state action that threatens certain fundamental features of 
                                                 
111 MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 147 (2007). 
112 Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 433, 440 (1983). Tribe has more recently suggested that some principles are too fundamental to be subject to 
amendment. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (2008). 
113 Unamendable norms may differ across jurisdictions. See Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321, 338 (2011). 
114 Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 753 (1980). 
115 Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1836 (2005). 
116 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 197-202 (1999). 
117 S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 43 (2001). 
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Indian constitutionalism.118 These fundamental features include the rule of law, the separation of 
powers, federalism, secularism and judicial review. 
 
Most notably, the Indian Supreme Court has invoked the basic structure doctrine to 
invalidate amendments to amendment rules. In 1980, the Court struck down Parliament’s effort 
to make two amendments to the Constitution’s amendment rules: one proposed amendment rule 
held that “no amendment of this Constitution … shall be called in question in any court on any 
ground” and the other that “for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no 
limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, 
variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.”119 These amendments, 
wrote Chief Justice Chandrachud, would have conferred upon Parliament “a vast and undefined 
power to amend the Constitution, even, so as to distort it out of recognition.”120 To remove all 
limitations on Parliament’s amendment power would “demolish[] the very pillars on which the 
preamble rests by empowering Parliament to exercise its constituent power without any 
‘limitation whatever.’”121 The Chief Justice reasoned that “since the Constitution had conferred a 
limited amending power on Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited 
power enlarge that very power into an absolute power. … The donee of a limited power cannot 
by the exercise of that power convert the limited power into an unlimited one.122  
 
The Court’s creation of the basic structure doctrine has invited the criticism that it “has 
helped itself to so much power … without explaining from whence its own authority is supposed 
to come.”123 The doctrine is susceptible to charges of democratic illegitimacy insofar as the 
Court has asserted the power to review the constitutionality of amendments,124 despite there 
being no textual authorization for the Court to exercise this power.125 In India, amendments are 
therefore not insulated from judicial review.126 The Court has accordingly often imposed limits 
on amendment, holding that amendment is a legislative procedure voidable where it “takes away 
or abridges” certain fundamental rights,127 that Parliament cannot exercise its amendment power 
to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution,128 and that an amendment will be 
invalidated where it violates the Constitution’s basic structure.129  
 
                                                 
118 Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Disharmonic Constitution, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 47, 60 
(Jeffrey Tulis et al. eds., 2010). 
119 Minerva Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, 1981 SCR (1) 206, 238 (1980). 
120 Id. at 240. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 70, 72 (2007). 
124 See JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE QUESTION OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 67 (2012); but see SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: 
A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE164-229 (2009) (defending the legitimacy of the doctrine).  
125 Richard Stith, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Extraordinary Power of Nepal’s Supreme 
Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 68 (1996). The doctrine is also seen, in contrast, as a “shield against 
predatory subversion of constitutionalism.” R. Sudarshan, Courts and Social Transformation in India, in COURTS 
AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 153, 165 (Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006). 
126 See Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476, 494 (2003). 
127 See I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, 1967 SCR (2) 762, 815 (1967). 
128 See Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State or Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (1973). 
129 See Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (1975). 
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In Japan, however, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to follow the lead of its Indian 
counterpart in reviewing amendments to amendment rules.130 The Court has generally been 
reluctant to exercise its power of judicial review, having invalidated only eight governmental 
acts through 2011,131 even though the Constitution expressly confers on courts the right to 
“determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”132 The Supreme 
Court has resisted calls to clarify the scope of Article 9, specifically with regard to the 
constitutionality of the Special Defense Forces,133 opting instead for a doctrine of avoidance.134 
As one observer has written, “it seems clear that Article 9 is not likely to be a constitutional 
provision enforced with vigor by the Japanese courts.”135 Japanese courts have instead deferred 
to the political branches on Article 9,136 and appear likely to do the same on Article 96. 
 
Japanese constitutional review is perhaps the most conservative in the democratic 
world.137 David Law has explained that judges resist exercising their power of judicial review as 
a result of the formal and informal institutions and practices that sensitize them to the views and 
preferences of political actors.138 An additional factor is that judges “tend to view the 
Constitution not as a law, but more as a political document stipulating political principles.”139 
Judges are therefore reluctant to judicialize politics by bringing political matters into the legal 
arena.140 They favor stability and predictability, privilege democratic decisionmaking, and do not 
see themselves as catalysts of social change.141 The power of judicial review on some matters has 
effectively been internalized within the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which advises political 
actors on the constitutionality of proposed laws and regulations, an arrangement upheld by the 
Supreme Court.142 The claim is not that the Bureau enjoys judicial deference, but rather that its 
                                                 
130 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 98 
(2003). 
131 Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 825 (2011). 
132 JAPAN CONST., ch. VI, art. 81. 
133 Toshihiro Yamauchi, Constitutional Pacifism: Principle, Reality, and Perspective, in FIVE DECADES OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 27, 39 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001). 
134 See Michael A. Panton, Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible Interpretation, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
129, 163-65 (2010). 
135 Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 3, 45 (1996). 
136 Allen Mendenhall, America Giveth, and America Taketh Away: The Fate of Article 9 After the Futenma Base 
Dispute, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 83, 102 (2011). 
137 DAVID M. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 121 (1995). 
138 David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1548-49 
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interpretation of contentious political matters, for instance Article 9, has mitigated the pressure 
on the Court to resolve the questions itself.143  
 
Judicial restraint in Japan makes it a credible possibility that political actors could 
successfully amend amendment rules without any intervening judicial review. Judicial 
constitutional review is therefore not likely to be invoked as an implicit limit to amending 
amendment rules where political actors deploy Article 96 to amend the amending clause and 
Article 9. This inadequate design of Japanese amendment rules leaves these rules susceptible to 
ordinary amendment. In Japan, as in other constitutional democracies where the judiciary is 
unlikely to follow the bold steps of the Indian Supreme Court to assert the unwritten power to 
review the constitutionality of amendments, political actors wishing to defend amendment rules 
against ordinary amendment need to rely on other strategies to remedy the textual limitations of 
the constitution’s current constitutional design. 
C. Unwritten Unamendability 
 
Political actors could invoke a third limit to amending amendment rules: unwritten 
unamendability. They could argue that amendment rules are implicitly unamendable and 
consequently unalterable by ordinary amendment. A constitutional provision or practice may 
become unwrittenly unamendable over time as it acquires special political or cultural 
significance. In contrast to the theoretical and sometimes textual distinction between amendment 
and revision, and likewise in contrast to judicial constitutional review which is enforced by 
courts, unwritten unamendability derives from the creation of a new constitutional convention. 
 
A constitutional convention develops as a result of a combination of action, agreement 
and acquiescence by political actors. They are political rules, not legal rules, and are enforced in 
the political process rather than courts.144 Conventions simply reflect “what people do,”145 which 
suggests that they can change over time and will survive only to the extent that political actors 
feel bound by them.146 They can constrain or compel the conduct of political actors given their 
perception as right or valid in political practice.147 That a constitutional provision or practice can 
become unwrittenly unamendable by convention is less developed than the distinction between 
amendment and revision or the judicial practice of reviewing the constitutionality of amendments 
on non-procedural grounds. Yet it is potentially a strong defense that political actors can mount 
to defend amendment rules from ordinary amendment.  
 
How and why an amendable constitutional provision or practice becomes implicitly 
unamendable is the key to understanding how unwritten unamendability could conceivably 
protect amendment rules in constitutional democracies generally and in Japan in particular. To 
illustrate, consider how the unilateral provincial power of amendment in the Constitution of 
                                                 
143 David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425, 1456 (2011). 
144 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (Liberty Fund 8th ed. 1915). 
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ACCOUNTABILITY 217 (1984). 
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147 Dicey, supra note 144.  
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Canada grew effectively unamendable.148 Under Canada’s founding constitution, the British 
North America Act, 1867 (since renamed the Constitution Act, 1867),149 an amendment could be 
made only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.150 The Constitution Act, 1867 authorized 
the individual provinces to amend their own provincial constitution but it conferred no similar 
power upon Canada to amend the Canadian Constitution.151 This unilateral provincial power was 
not expressly unamendable; it was an amendable rule like any other. 
 
In 1949, the United Kingdom passed an amendment, at Canada’s request, authorizing the 
Parliament of Canada to formally amend the Canadian Constitution.152 With a few exceptions, 
this amendment gave the Canadian Parliament the same amendment power as to the purely 
federal subjects of the Canadian Constitution that the Constitution Act, 1867 had given provinces 
as to their own provincial constitutions.153 The provinces objected that the new amendment could 
allow the Canadian Parliament to unilaterally amend federal institutions of provincial concern, 
for instance the composition of the Senate or representation in the House of Commons.154 The 
1949 amendment was therefore more complicating than clarifying, but whether a province 
should retain the power to amend its own constitution was never in doubt. The development of 
Canadian federalism to that point had allowed no other view but that provinces possessed a 
sphere of sovereignty immune to the national government and the United Kingdom.155   
 
Canada finally formally divested the United Kingdom of its amendment authority in 1982 
when federal and provincial political actors agreed to entrench five amendment rules to govern 
amendments affecting purely federal or provincial subjects, as well as those affecting both levels 
of government.156 Federal and provincial political actors had tried on many occasions to design 
amendment rules that would authorize Canada to amend its own constitution. But they failed 
each time, over a dozen in total,157 due largely to disagreement on the right quantum of 
agreement for provincial consent to an amendment affecting both levels of government.158 
 
There was one constant in Canada’s efforts for a negotiated settlement on amendment 
rules: provinces would retain the unilateral power to amend their own constitutions. As early as a 
                                                 
148 Another useful Canadian illustration is the development of the constitutional convention of substantial provincial 
consent for constitutional amendments to matters of federal-provincial concern. See Reference re: Resolution to 
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150 Peter W. Hogg, A Comment on the Canadian Constitutional Crisis, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 285, 287-
88 (1980). 
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152 British North America (No. 2) Act, ch. 81, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 (1949).  
153 Id. at § 1. 
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74, 75-76 (1950). 
155 For a more extended discussion on dual sovereignty in Canada and the evolution of federalism, see Richard 
Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2014), available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461509 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
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1927 Dominion-Provincial Conference, the national government’s Minister of Justice suggested 
an amendment structure that left unchanged the unilateral provincial amendment power.159 Later 
in 1935, the House of Commons convened a special committee to “study and report on the best 
method by which the British North America Act may be amended… .”160 The Committee was 
particularly concerned with protecting provincial powers and fundamental rights, searching for 
guidance on “safeguard[ing] the existing rights or racial and religious minorities and legitimate 
provincial claims to autonomy.”161 At the Constitutional Conference of 1950, then-Prime 
Minister Louis St. Laurent stated the federal government’s test for designing an amendment 
framework: it must respect the autonomy of provincial governments, the power of the federal 
government, minority rights, and it must be sufficiently flexible to allow change when needed.162 
The same principle of provincial sovereignty in provincial matters held throughout subsequent 
negotiations in the intervening decades.163 The unilateral provincial amendment power was 
therefore never in doubt, even amid uncertainty about what amendment structure Canada would 
eventually adopt. It had become non-negotiable, and therefore unwrittenly unamendable as a 
result of the entrenchment of a convention as to its fundamentality in Canada. 
 
Like the unilateral provincial formula, Japan’s Pacifism Clause may have become 
unwrittenly unamendable. The Clause traces its beginnings to General MacArthur’s three 
essential requirements for Japan’s revised constitution, one of which was the renunciation of 
war.164 Despite entrenching an inherited disability,165 the Clause has become central to Japan’s 
legal and political culture,166 and so important that it is now seen as constitutive of Japan’s 
constitutional identity.167 Though the Constitution had been effectively imposed on Japan and the 
Allies had steered much of the design of the Constitution,168 “the vast majority of the Japanese 
citizenry, who felt betrayed by the wartime leadership, quickly embraced the new Constitution, 
                                                 
159 Précis of Discussions: Dominion-Provincial Conference, Nov. 3-10, 1927, at 11, Sessional Paper No. 3, 18 
George V (King’s Printer, Ottawa 1928). 
160 Order of Reference, Jan. 28, 1935, in PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE AND REPORT: SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, at iv (King’s Printer, Ottawa 1935). 
161 Id.  
162 Remarks of Louis St. Laurent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF FEDERAL AND 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, Ottawa, Jan. 10-12, 1950, at 10 (King’s Printer, Ottawa, 1950). 
163 See, e.g., Statement by A. Brian Peckford, Nov. 2, 1981, Document 800-15/011, in FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL 
CONFERENCE OF FIRST MINISTERS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Ottawa 1981); Statement of Peter Lougheed, Alberta 
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Third Working Session, in FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE OF 1971 at 2, Feb. 9, 1971; Canadian Constitutional 
Charter of 1971, art. 54, in SECRETARIAT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE, 
Victoria, British Columbia, June 14-16, 1971; GUY FAVREAU, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, THE AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 38-39 (Ottawa 1965). 
164 Wen-Chen Chang, East Asian Foundations for Constitutionalism: Three Models Reconstructed, 3 NAT’L TAIWAN 
U. L. REV. 111, 118 (2008). 
165 George P. Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1537 
(2002). 
166 Lawrence W. Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 
815, 829 (1997). 
167 Chaihark Hahm & Sung Ho Kim, To Make “We the People”: Constitutional Founding in Postwar Japan and 
South Korea, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 800, 814 (2010). 
168 The process may have been more collaborative than the conventional wisdom suggests. See Michael J. Kelly, The 
Article 9 Pacifism Clause and Japan’s Place in the World, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 491, 493 (2007). 
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including Article 9.”169 The earliest efforts to amend Article 9 failed for many reasons, chief 
among them the already overwhelming popular support for the Clause.170 Subsequent efforts to 
amend Article 9, from the Hatoyama administration after the Occupation in the 1950s and into 
the Miyazawa administration in the 1990s, also failed in light of strong public opposition.171  
 
 The Pacifism Clause seems more strongly entrenched in Japanese political culture than it 
is in the constitutional text. Almost as soon as it was adopted, the Pacifism Clause began to erode 
under pressure from the Korean War into which Japan became involved passively, resulting in “a 
departure from both the letter and the spirit of Article 9.”172 This change occurred without 
amendment but with a declarative announcement that Article 9 banned only the offensive use of 
force.173 Decades later, the Pacifism Clause has been “reinterpreted creatively to allow the use of 
some forces,”174 Japan now spends one of the world’s largest military budgets, and its Self-
Defense Forces number 240,000.175  
 
Yet even as Article 9’s textual absolutism on war-making has given way to the reality of 
Japan’s militarism,176 the Pacifism Clause has become “an anchor of [Japan’s] postwar identity,” 
the consequence of the “trauma of atomic bombing and catastrophic defeat [that] discredited 
militarism and created a profound commitment to peace in the new nuclear age.”177 Not unlike 
the Second Amendment in the United States, Article 9 is more than a textual rule.178 It is a 
“culturally embedded norm” that has “shaped Japanese individual and group identities, social 
relations, and practices” and which “provides a sense of security in the Northeast region, 
including China and Korea, where bitter memories of Japan’s wartime aggression still linger.”179 
Amending Article 9 would mark a fundamental change to Japan’s constitutional identity. 
 
How Article 9 has become a super-constitutional norm is as difficult to explain as it is to 
deny. Part of the answer involves the constitutional text itself. As Mark Chinen observes, “the 
values implicit in the Constitution have become ingrained in Japanese society over the past 60 
years, in part, precisely because of Article 9.”180 Next to the preambular declaration of popular 
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sovereignty, the Pacifism Clause is seen as the most important part of the Constitution.181 Part of 
the answer also involves social assimilation into a culture where pacifism is a point of pride and 
Article 9 is taught in schools to children.182 Article 9 has become a legal, social and constitutive 
norm also as a result of extraordinary public relations efforts, including the creation of a 
Committee to Popularize the Constitution,183 which once worked to culturally entrench pacifism 
as a cultural norm through public lectures, books, free pamphlets and booklets, film and songs.184 
 
The entrenchment of the Pacifism Clause in Japanese political culture is also attributable 
to geopolitics. Akitoshi Miyashita has explored the origin and sustainability of the Japanese 
cultural norm of postwar pacifism.185 He concludes that “the extent to which pacifist norms are 
sustained has a lot to do with Japan’s security environment and domestic political conditions, 
such as security ties with the United States, threat perception, economic prosperity, and political 
stability.”186 Pacifism grew in Japan when the country strengthened its alliance with the United 
States: as the latter reinforced the former as its guarantor, support for pacifism would likely have 
been unsustainable without the military security the United States offered Japan.187  Miyashita 
acknowledges the role of history in shaping pacifism in Japan, but he concludes that it is the 
product of powerful norms and cultural forces as well as structural and material realities.188 
 
Despite its significance in Japanese political culture, the Pacifism Clause is not formally 
entrenched against amendment. But political actors could argue that it has become so important 
that it should be immune to ordinary amendment. Political actors have in the past made a similar 
argument that Article 9 forever commits Japan to non-militarism.189 Today the argument could 
take one of two forms. First, political actors opposed amending the Pacifism Clause could argue 
that it has by convention acquired the unwritten quality of unamendability given its importance 
to Japanese political, social and constitutional culture. The development of such convention of 
unamendability would reflect the historical significance of the Clause to Japan.190 Given that 
changing the Pacifism Clause would change not only Japan’s Constitution but more broadly its 
national identity, political actors might argue that the Clause may be changed only by revision. 
Alternatively, political actors could concede that the Pacifism Clause is amendable, though 
suggest that amendment can occur only with a threshold higher than what Article 96 requires; 
this argument would claim that the Clause is implicitly entrenched against ordinary amendment. 
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Yet the theory of unwritten unamendability is stronger in theory than reality. Although 
the Pacifism Clause may hold special historical and contemporary significance, it is treated in the 
constitutional text like all other provisions; it is freely amendable by ordinary amendment. It is 
also problematic to claim that it should be subject to some form of heightened threshold because 
the text neither states nor implies such a requirement. There is no effective constraint preventing 
political actors from proposing or pursuing its amendment, and opponents can point to no 
constitutional language nor identify any entrenched rule to justify their defense of amendment 
rules. Amending the Pacifism Clause is achievable through the ordinary amendment process as 
defined by Article 96, even though the Clause is constitutive value of Japanese political culture. 
IV.  REDESIGNING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RULES 
 
The easy fix to the double amendment problem is to absolutely entrench the entrenching 
rule in order to prevent its amendment. Unamendability, however, is problematic for reasons I 
have developed elsewhere.191 Amendment rules should not be immune from amendment but they 
should be specially entrenched, as I have argued above.192 Yet amendment rules today 
inadequately protect themselves against ordinary amendment. The defective design of 
unamendability and the weak protections of escalating amendment fail to insulate amendment 
rules against circumvention and fleeting majorities. Each of the three related implicit limits to 
amendment—the distinction between amendment and revision, judicial constitutional review, 
and unwritten amendability—raises problems of its own. Unwritten unamendability and the 
distinction between amendment and revision both require enforcement by the very political 
actors who would defy it. Judicial constitutional review invites charges of democratic 
illegitimacy where it is not textually authorized, and it is moreover an unworkable solution in 
constitutional democracies like Japan with conservative courts. Amendment rules therefore 
require other ways to defend themselves. 
 
In this Part, I suggest two modest textual entrenchment strategies to protect amendment 
rules against ordinary amendment. The more advisable strategy is to design amendment rules in 
conformity with the principles of intertemporality and relativity. Intertemporality, as I define it, 
counsels a commitment to respecting the considered judgment of the community as expressed 
over a period of years, and not only at one fixed point in time. We can operationalize 
intertemporality by requiring sequential approval—multiple votes over multiple years—for 
amending amendment rules. For its part, relativity counsels a commitment to entrenching 
amendment rules under higher thresholds than other constitutional provisions. The purpose of 
relativity is to express the special importance of amendment rules relative to other constitutional 
provisions. Relativity is operationalized by the escalating structure of amendment rules. 
 
The first strategy I recommend below combines intertemporality with relativity by 
entrenching sequential approval and escalation in combination, and entrenching their entrenching 
clauses. Another, though much less advisable, strategy is to entrench the power of judicial 
constitutional review over amendments, and entrenching its entrenching clause. Either of these 
entrenchment strategies would better entrench amendment rules against ordinary amendment 
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than the defective texts and implicit limits on which political actors today must rely.193 The first 
is preferable, however, because it escapes the countermajoritarian critique of the second. 
 
Although comparative constitutional study sometimes trivializes the constitutional text,194 
in constitutional democracies the text matters because public officials generally try to follow its 
commands,195 in contrast to constitutional dictatorships ruling under a façade constitution that 
betrays great distance between what Jan-Erik Lane calls constitutional formalia and 
constitutional realia.196 Written constitutions in constitutional democracies constrain state 
action,197 publicize rights and rules,198 and help keep political actors accountable to the rule of 
law.199 But writtenness alone is not the answer. The challenge of protecting amendment rules is 
not only to democratize amendment rules;200 it is to do so in a way that also ensures their 
procedures reflect the considered rather than fleeting judgment of the constitutional community.  
A. Combining Sequential Approval and Escalation 
 
Escalating amendment rules are insufficient on their own to protect amendment rules 
against ordinary amendment. The problem would remain, as discussed above,201 that a 
particularly strong but fleeting and unsustainable supermajority could meet the higher threshold 
at any one time. Whether a supermajority endorses a transformative change tells us little about 
whether change should actually occur.202 Where a strong supermajority meets the heightened 
threshold for amending amendment rules we must interrogate whether the support for such a 
fundamental change is stable and representative of the considered intertemporal judgment of the 
community. Supermajorities are not created equal: their strength is directly proportional to their 
stability over time. A sustainable supermajority thus has a greater claim to representativeness 
than a temporary one. What underpins this view is a theory of transcendent sovereignty that 
assigns to some combination of previous, present and future political actors—rather than only to 
the present generation—the shared responsibility for ratifying transformative change.203 
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In this study of time and constitutionalism, Jed Rubenfeld theorizes that constitutional 
self-government entails a necessary temporal dimension.204 Democratic freedom is today too 
narrowly understood to require conformity to the will of the “actual people of the here and 
now.”205 Democracy exists rather only intertemporally, that is to say over a period of time, and 
consists “not in governance by the present will of the governed, or in governance by the a-
temporal truths posited by one or another moral philosopher, but rather in a people’s living out 
its own self-given political and legal commitments over time—apart from or even contrary to 
popular will at any given moment.”206 Conceiving of democracy as an exclusively presentist 
enterprise misunderstands that constitutional law is undemocratic when it privileges the will of 
today’s governed instead of accounting for the will of the governed over time.207 
 
This temporal dimension of constitutional self-government counsels a non-presentist 
view of democratic legitimacy anchored in “the idea of a generation-spanning people acting as a 
political subject.”208 On this theory, “written self-government does not demand that new 
constitutional principles be adopted whenever a majority so wills. It demands the creation of new 
constitutional commitments only when a people is prepared to make a significant temporal 
commitment to them.”209 This temporal dimension moreover confirms the view that 
supermajority choice alone cannot give democratic legitimacy to that choice. Even the “most 
solemn act of memorialization, backed up by the unanimous vote of every citizen alive at the 
moment of proclamation, does not guarantee that a nation is in fact committed to the proclaimed 
purpose or principle.”210 A single successful supermajority vote satisfying heightened threshold 
cannot “claim the full authority of a popular commitment unless it succeeds over time: unless it 
takes and holds.”211 Democratic structures must recognize that “commitments take time.”212 
 
The best design of formal rules to amend amendment rules reflects this intertemporal 
dimension of democratic and constitutional self-government. It generates sustained popular 
engagement, and thereby creates the condition for legitimating across time the collective 
commitment to amending those fundamental rules.213 We can operationalize intertemporality by 
requiring sequential approval—multiple votes over multiple years—for amending amendment 
rules in order to defend amendment rules against ordinary amendment. Sequential approval is a 
delaying device that precommits political actors, cools passions, invites deliberation and an 
opportunity to reaffirm or reject constitutional commitment, and it moderates constitutional 
change.214 Under sequential approval, it would require at least one initial and one confirmatory 
vote in order to amend amendment rules.215 Here is an example of a textual entrenchment 
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strategy reflecting sequential approval: “An amendment to [amendment rules] shall require the 
initial and confirmatory approval of two-thirds of each chamber of the national legislature and of 
a majority of eligible voting citizens in a national referendum. The initial and confirmatory votes 
shall occur no fewer nor any later than five years apart.”  
 
The interim period above in the sample entrenchment—here, five years—could be shorter 
or longer, depending on design preferences. It is important, however, that the interim period be 
neither too short nor too long. If it is too short, it frustrates the purpose of sequential approval, 
which is to create sufficient time for political actors and voters to engage meaningfully in 
constitutional deliberation over years before any amendment to amendment rules. If the interim 
period is too long, the risk becomes what has delegitimized the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 
the eyes of many critics, specifically that it lacks contemporaneity between proposal and 
ratification.216 The amendment was originally proposed in 1792 and ratified two hundred years 
later in 1992.217 Sequential approval must occur within a reasonable amount of time so as to 
retain contemporaneity between the proposal of an amendment and its eventual ratification. 
 
Sequential approval has three design strengths related to the intertemporal dimension of 
constitutional self-government. First, the suggested five-year period generally coincides for the 
most part with intervening executive or legislative elections, or both, between the initial and 
confirmatory approval,218 therefore allowing eligible voters to directly or indirectly express their 
agreement or disagreement both in referendal votes and in executive and legislative elections.219 
Second, sequential approval offers multiple opportunities for public discussion on the proposed 
amendment of amendment rules, be it in the context of an intervening election, in an initial or 
confirmatory vote, or during the interim period. Sequential approval also tests the sustainability 
and sociological legitimacy of the support for amending the constitution’s amendment rules. It 
demands durable ratifying majorities in order to neutralize the risk that an unstable or 
unrepresentative majority momentarily captures the amendment process. 
 
But sequential approval alone is insufficient. The principle of relativity, operationalized 
by escalating amendment rules, can combine with intertemporality to generate a useful defense 
of amendment rules from ordinary amendment. Specifically, I recommend combining sequential 
approval with an escalating structure of formal amendment pursuant to which amendment rules 
would be subject to a higher threshold of amendment relative to other constitutional provisions.  
                                                 
216 See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, What do you Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 9, 14-15 (1993) (questioning the legitimacy of the amendment); Sanford Levinson, Authorizing 
Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 101, 103-05 (1994) 
(describing scholarly critiques of the amendment); Ruth Ann Strickland, The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and 
Constitutional Change by Stealth, 26 POL. SCI. & POL. 716, 720-21 (1993) (discussing critiques from scholars and 
political actors). 
217 Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 678 (1993). 
218 For constitutional states where executive or legislative elections do not occur with regularity within five years, 
the design of amendment rules can require the dissolution and reconstitution of the national legislature between the 
initial and confirmatory approval procedures. 
219 Like the Notwithstanding Clause in Canada, this five-year period separating initial and confirmatory votes 
effectively doubles as a sunset clause. Where political actors and citizens do not confirm the initial vote, the 
amendment proposal expires. See Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Learning to Live with the Override, 32 MCGILL L.J. 
541, 562 (1990).  
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Requiring a heightened threshold for amending amendment rules, and moreover insisting 
on confirmatory approval of the initial approval would yield the following sample amendment 
rule, recognizing that the details on precise majorities and timing could be tailored to local 
preferences: “An amendment to [Section entrenching amendment rules] shall become valid when 
it has received initial and confirmatory approval from each house of the national legislature with 
a supporting vote of at least 75 percent of its members, followed by a national referendum with a 
supporting vote of at least 60 percent of eligible voting citizens. The initial and confirmatory 
approval shall be scheduled no fewer than five years apart. This section shall be amendable by 
the same requirements of initial and confirmatory approval.” Note that this amendment rule is 
itself specially entrenched, thereby avoiding the double amendment problem. The purpose of 
entrenching escalation and confirmation in designing rules to amend amendment rules 
themselves is to palliate the risk of temporary majorities, to reflect the considered judgment of 
the community, and to design a transparent process for fundamental constitutional choices. 
B. Entrenching Judicial Constitutional Review 
 
Constitutional designers could alternatively or in addition entrench the judicial power to 
review amendments. This strategy is less advisable than the first, but it is in any event better than 
the current defective design of amendment rules. Admittedly, as discussed above in connection 
with the Indian Supreme Court’s basic structure doctrine, the judicial power to review 
constitutional amendments is subject to serious criticisms from the perspective of democratic 
theory.220 As an empirical matter, it is also true that entrenching judicial constitutional review 
would not be effective in all constitutional democracies, particularly those with weak 
constitutional courts, or none at all. Nonetheless, it is an entrenchment strategy that can at least 
theoretically be deployed to defend amendment rules against ordinary amendment. 
 
Under this textual design strategy, the constitutional text would expressly authorize 
courts to evaluate the constitutionality of constitutional changes, whether ordinary amendments 
that amount to no more than fine-tuning the constitution or extraordinary revisions effecting 
transformative constitutional change. Absent this entrenched power of review, courts in 
constitutional democracies could of course invoke foreign case law to defend an unwritten power 
to invalidate amendments, but justifying and legitimizing that power based on non-domestic 
sources could itself pose a challenge.221 I therefore suggest exploring textual strategies to justify 
and legitimate the power internally to the regime. This would not preclude courts from 
referencing foreign sources to reinforce the judicial power entrenched in the constitutional text. 
 
Consider three textual strategies to entrench the judicial power to review amendments.222 
First, the text may entrench the judicial power to review only amendments to amendment rules. 
Second, the text may entrench the judicial power to review all amendments, including those 
targeting amendment rules. Third, the text may entrench the distinction between amendment and 
revision, and implicitly or preferably expressly authorize courts to police the boundary 
                                                 
220 See infra Section III.B. 
221 See Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of “Supra-Constitutional” Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557, 572-74 (2013). 
222 These strategies presuppose that constitutional designers prefer continuous over discontinuous forms of change. 
See SUBER, supra note 15, at 18-20. 
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separating one from the other. In any case, the entrenching clause should itself be specially 
entrenched to avoid double amendment. Consider briefly each of these three in turn.  
 
The modest option is to entrench judicial review only of amendments to amendment 
rules. For example, the entrenching clause could read: “Before it shall be promulgated as a part 
of this Constitution, any amendment to [the Section on amendment rules] shall be reviewed by 
the [national court of last resort] for conformity with this Constitution.” This would authorize 
courts to evaluate whether the proposed amendment is consistent with the presuppositions of the 
existing constitution and whether political actors have violated its unwritten spirit. This narrow 
power would be limited to only exceptional amendments that impact amendment rules. Norway 
adopts a related strategy to protect the “spirit” of the constitution in its design of amendment 
rules: an amendment “must never, however, contradict the principles embodied in this 
Constitution, but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the 
spirit of the Constitution.”223 This provision is not, however, explicit about the judicial role, nor 
does it relate exclusively to the amendment of amendment rules. 
 
 An alternative is to entrench judicial review of all amendment. This would give courts 
broader power not unlike the unwritten power possessed by the Indian Supreme Court.224 Under 
this alternative, the optimal design to defend amendment rules from amendment authorizes the 
judiciary to review both the form and content of amendment. The South African Constitution 
provides a useful illustration: “Only the Constitutional Court may decide on the constitutionality 
of any amendment to the Constitution.”225 The South African Constitutional Court may therefore 
invalidate amendments due both to procedural faults in the amendment process and to 
substantive unconstitutionality. Where a constitutional democracy relies on the judiciary to 
protect amendment rules, courts should have the power to review more than just form.226 
 
 A third option is to textually entrench the distinction between amendment and revision, 
and to authorize courts to judge whether a constitutional change amounts to one or the other. For 
example, where political actors seek to change amendment rules using amendment procedures, 
the court could invoke the entrenched distinction between amendment and revision to invalidate 
the amendment and require political actors to pursue the change through revision procedures. 
The Costa Rican Constitution provides a model for this strategy: it establishes less involved rules 
for amendment than revision, and stipulates that revision requires a Constituent Assembly 
convened for that purpose.227 To protect amendment rules in a constitutional democracy using 
this third strategy, the constitutional text could stipulate that any constitutional change to 
                                                 
223 NORWAY CONST., pt. E, art. 112 (1814). 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 116-29. 
225 SOUTH AFRICA CONST., ch. 8, art. 167(4)(d) (1996). 
226 Although the Turkish Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to review only the form of formal 
amendments, see Turkey Const., pt. III, ch. 3, art. 148 (1982), the Court has recently expanded its authority to 
review the content of formal amendment as well. See Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendment—The Turkish Perspective, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 197-99 (2012). 
227 COSTA RICA CONST., tit. XVII, arts. 195-96. (1949). A similar distinction exists between partial and total 
revision, and courts have operationalized it in the same way. See Carlos Bernal-Pulido & Yaniv Roznai, Article 
Review/Response, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia, INT’L J. CONST. L. 
BLOG, October 17, 2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/10/article-review-response-carlos-bernal-
pulido-and-yaniv-roznai-on-unconstitutional-constitutional-amendments (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
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amendment rules amounts to a revision and consequently requires the more involved process. 
The best design would also expressly authorize the judiciary to enforce the distinction between 
amendment and revision, although courts could presumably infer this power from the distinction 
itself. Yet leaving the enforcement power implicit would make it more susceptible to challenge. 
 
These three modest design strategies address the criticisms leveled at the Indian Supreme 
Court for creating the basic structure doctrine and exercising its self-conferred power to review 
the constitutionality of amendments.228 Although the Indian Supreme Court now possesses the 
power to invalidate amendments to amendment rules, this extraordinary power was not initially 
perceived as a legitimate exercise of its authority.229 That the power was not textually entrenched 
undermined the Court’s claim to it, and observers saw it “as a brazen attempt by the [Court] to 
rewrite the Constitution.”230 Since then, in the face of institutional failures in the legislative and 
executive branches,231 the Court has positioned itself as the guarantor of democracy in India and 
as the “nation’s prime defense against autocracy.”232 Nonetheless, the basic structure doctrine 
remains deeply problematic,233 and it stirs continuing doubt about its democratic legitimacy.234 
Insofar as the resistance to the basic structure doctrine derives largely from its unwrittenness,235 
critics could still challenge it as undemocratic or inconsistent with popular sovereignty were the 
power of judicial review of amendments textually entrenched. But its textual entrenchment 
would confer legal legitimacy upon it and help disarm their criticisms. And its own special 
entrenchment would avoid the problem of double amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Modern constitutions generally fail to specially entrench amendment rules. I have 
therefore suggested two modest textual entrenchment strategies for constitutional designers to 
consider when designing amendment rules: entrenching sequential approval and escalation in 
combination; and entrenching the power of judicial constitutional review over amendments. Both 
textual entrenchments should themselves be specially entrenched. These strategies would address 
the defective design of unamendability and the weak protections of escalating amendment 
thresholds alone. Although political actors may always invoke implicit limits to amendment to 
defend amendment rules—the distinction between amendment and revision, judicial 
constitutional review, and unwritten amendability—each of these raises problems of its own. 
Unwritten unamendability and the distinction between amendment and revision both require 
enforcement by the very political actors who would defy these limits, while judicial 
                                                 
228 See Section III.B. 
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230 SUDHANSHU RANJAN, JUSTICE, JUDOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 44 (2012). 
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232 Gerald E. Beller, Benevolent Illusions in a Developing Society: The Assertion of Supreme Court Authority in 
Democratic India, 36 WEST. POL. Q. 513, 528 (1983). 
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J. COMP. L. 495, 501 n.34 (1989). 
234 See Venkat Iyer, The Supreme Court of India, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS 121, 
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constitutional review is susceptible to criticisms of democratic illegitimacy where it is not 
textually authorized. The textual entrenchment strategies I suggest create more effective and 
transparent forms of protection for amendment rules. 
 
James Madison questioned whether we could trust such “parchment barriers” to 
withstand the “encroaching spirit of power.”236 Written constitutions, after all, are just words and 
“to think that words can constrain power seems foolish.”237 Yet in constitutional democracies, 
the enterprise of self-government relies on texts, whether a master-text or a collection of texts 
and precedents,238 not to substitute for democratic practices but to reinforce them.239 Though 
they may be written, amendment rules are effective only to the extent they are perceived as 
legitimate constraints worthy of public acceptance and thereby actually bind political actors. 
Their legitimacy and constraining force is predicated on social and political support,240 which in 
turn increases the instrumental value of the document as a safeguard for democracy.241 
Amendment rules can successfully preside over the “rules of the political game” only where they 
themselves “avoid becoming the political game.”242 It is therefore important to protect them. 
 
There remains much to study about amendment rules. In Japan, specifically, it would be 
fruitful to explore the constitutional history of failed efforts to amend its amendment rules. It 
would be equally interesting to uncover the drafting history of Article 96, and whether its 
thresholds were seen as difficult at their origin as they appear today. Beyond the Japanese 
Constitution, the United States Constitution’s Article V has itself been the target of failed 
amendment efforts. Constitutional historians could help explain why and how those efforts 
failed, and what modern constitutional reformers can learn from those failures. Another 
underexplored question involves whether amendment rules remain necessary in light of the 
informal mechanisms political actors have innovated to update written constitutions. Though 
amendment rules today retain at least one important functional purpose—to alter the 
constitutional text where time and experience reveal errors—the prevalence of informal 
amendment may in the future obviate their usefulness. I disagree with this view,243 but further 
scholarly inquiry into the functions of amendment rules would be valuable. 
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